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It is a rare occurrence when the New York Times/ Washing-
ton Post,2 NPR,3 and even Jack Kilpatrick4 discuss a political sci-
ence paper. Nonetheless, that is what happened after A Pattern 
of Analysis of the Second Rehnquist US Supreme Court, by Law-
rence Sirovich,5 was published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science in June 2003. Sirovich's paper applies two 
unusual mathematical techniques to the decisions of the Court 
with the aim of "extracting key patterns and latent informa-
tion."6 Using information theory, and in particular the idea of 
entropy, Sirovich claims that the "Court acts as if composed of 
4.68 ideal Justices."7 After applying a singular value decomposi-
tion to the decision data he concludes that the Court's decisions 
can be accurately approximated by a suitably chosen two-
dimensional space. 
While some commentary has questioned whether Sirovich's 
conclusions are novel, at least one of the methods of analysis is 
new (in the context of political science) and might also prove 
useful in other circumstances. Moreover the methods themselves 
raise interesting questions about the Court. It is therefore 
worthwhile to consider the methods more carefully. 
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Before discussing the methods themselves, we need to ex-
plore how Sirovich encodes data from the Court. He starts by 
ordering the Justices in alphabetical order (although any order 
would work) and then encodes each decision by a vector with 
nine entries in which a 1 signifies a Justice who was in the major-
ity and a -1 signifies a Justice in the minority. For example, a 
case decided unanimously is coded (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) and a case 
decided by the classic 5-4 conservative-liberal split (say Garrett) 
is coded (-1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1) where the first -1 indicates that 
Breyer (the alphabetically first Justice) was in the minority and 
the last 1 indicates that Thomas (the alphabetically last Justice) 
was in the majority.9 Thus, Sirovich reduces each case to a string 
of 1 and -1 's of length 9. I will refer to these codings as vote-
patterns. 
There are two things worth noting about Sirovich's data set. 
First, he records the decisions of the Court and not the opinions. 
For instance, Lawrence v. Texas 10 is recorded as (1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1,-1) 
with O'Connor listed in the majority even though she did not 
join the majority opinion. The second fact worth noting is that 
Sirovich discarded 30% of the cases because "the vote was in-
complete or ambiguous (per curiam . . . decisions furnished no 
details of the vote and were deemed inadmissible, as were cases 
in which a Justice was absent or voted differently on the parts of 
a case)."11 Later I will reexamine his decision to exclude these 
cases. 
ENTROPY 
The most original part of Sirovich's paper is his use of in-
formation theory, and in particular the idea of entropy, to ana-
lyze the Supreme Court. Sirovich uses information theory to 
measure the variability of the set of vote patterns of the Court. 
While others have discussed the distribution of decisions from 
the Court,12 and the correlation of votes among the Justices13 no 
8. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001 ). 
9. The alphabetical order of the Justices is Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas. 
10. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
II. Sirovich, supra note 5, at 7432. 
12. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides 
Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131 (2001); Paul H. 
Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Ma-
jorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000). 
13. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
179, 402 tbi.I (2000) ("Harvard Table"). 
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one has proposed an overall measure of the variability of deci-
sions until now. This fact alone makes Sirovich's paper worth 
reading. 
Entropy is a measure of the total amount of variability in a 
situation. Suppose there are n different possible outcomes which 
we list as J, 2, ... , n and that outcome j occurs with probability Pi 
The entropy of this set of outcomes is defined to be 
n 
I= -'Lp1 logp1 
j=l 
where the logarithm is taken to be base 2.14 Entropy measured in 
these terms can be interpreted as the smallest average code word 
needed to convey the outcomes.15 It is infeasible to provide a 
complete explanation here, but a few examples should suffice to 
explain how it works. 
First, a small example to help clarify the ideas. Suppose that 
when you talk to your stockbroker he recommends Buy with 
probability lh , Hold with probability ~ and Sell with probability 
K What is the entropy of his recommendations? Applying the 
formula above yields 
I= _ _!_ x log_!_ _ _!_ x log_!_ _ _!_ x log_!_= _ _!_ x (-1)-_!_ x (- 2)-_!_ x (-2) = 1_. 
2 24 44 4 2 4 4 2 
Remember that the log function here is base 2, so log (2°) = n. 
What is the significance of the value 3/2? Suppose your stock-
broker had to communicate by Morse Code with you and he 
wanted to use, on average, as short a set of symbols as possible. 
If he encoded Buy with a dot, Sell with a dash-dot and Hold with 
a dash-dash, the expected length of his recommendation signal 
would be 3/2. This is because Buy is coded with a single symbol 
and occurs half the time, and Hold and Sell each are coded with 
two symbols and occur a quarter of the time. The expected 
14. The log base 2 of a number xis the number y with the property that 2 raised to 
the y" power is x. In other words, y= log x means that 2Y=x. So log 8 = 3 since 23=8. In-
formation theory commonly uses logarithms base 2 because information is typically en-
coded into binary signals. Most calculators do not provide a key for computing the log 
base 2 of a number, but it can be computed using the fact that the log base 2 of a number 
x is In xI In 2 where In x is the natural log of x. Most calculators provide a key for com-
puting the natural log. 
15. There is a huge amount of mathematics stuffed in this sentence. Entropy in this 
context is a part of information theory and concerns itself with the inherent amount of 
information contained in a set of outcomes. One measure of that amount of information 
is how efficiently one can code it and transmit it to a third party. For a more detailed 
technical exposition, see STEVEN ROMAN, CODING AND INFORMATION THEORY, 39-68 
(1992). 
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length therefore is ~ x 1 + 1Ax2+ 1Ax2 = 3/2. One can show that 
this is the best possible way to encode this information. 16 
Let us examine Sirovich's examples. Sirovich calls an "Om-
niscient Court" one for which every decision is unanimous. For 
such a court, there is only one outcome, which occurs with prob-
ability 1. By the above formula, I=O. This accords with our intui-
tion since we assume that all the opinions will come down the 
same way and hence we get no new information from seeing one. 
It is worth noting, though, that unanimity has nothing to do 
with this analysis. What matters is that every opinion is the same. 
If every case were to be decided by the canonical conservative 
versus liberal 5-4 margin, the entropy would still be 0. Omnis-
cience, in and of itself, has nothing to do with the amount of en-
tropy. 
The other extreme case, as proposed by Sirovich, is the 
"platonic" Court. In this instance, he assumes that each Justice is 
equally likely to vote for one side as the other, which is to say 
"the vote of a platonic justice is as predictable as the toss of a 
fair coin. "17 In this situation there are 28=256 different possible 
outcomes and all of them are equally likely. To see this, note 
that the total number of strings of length nine where each entry 
is a 1 or -1 is 29=512, because there are two possibilities for each 
coordinate. By the way we have encoded the decisions, we only 
consider those with more 1's than -1's (since a 1 indicates that 
Justice is in the majority) and exactly half of the 512 strings have 
that property. Applying the entropy formula leads to 
256 1 1 1 -8 
I=-I- log-= -log-= -log2 = 8 
j=l 256 256 256 
for the entropy calculation. The significance of the value 8 is 
that, if we were clever, we could convey this information using 
only strings whose average length is 8 instead of 9.18 
How, then, does Sirovich compute the entropy of the 
Court? Using data from October Term 1994 through October 
Term 2001, he computes the probability of a given majority coa-
16. You might think one could do better by encoding Buy as dot, Hold as dash, and 
Sell as dash-dot lowering the average length. This is not acceptable (by information theo-
retic standards, at least) because if, thereby you were to see dash-dot you would not 
know whether that was a single Sell recommendation or two recommendations, one a 
Buy and one a Hold. I told you there was a lot buried in here. 
17. Sirovich, supra note 5, at 7433. 
18. The intuition behind this is that there is one less degree of freedom in the data 
because, by the nature of the encoding, the number of l's will always be larger than the 
number of -l's. 
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lition by counting the number of times it occurred and dividing 
by the total number of cases. Then he computes entropy using 
the above formula to get a value of 3.68. He concludes that the 
Court behaves like 4.68 "platonic" Justices. The equivalent 
number of "platonic" Justices is one more than the entropy be-
cause a Court with no entropy still has a judge to cast the unique 
decision. Alternatively, as noted earlier/9 since the judgments 
are encoded so that there is always a larger number of 1 's than -1 's, 
there is always an extra degree of freedom in the number of 
judges over the entropy. 
This method of computing a global measure of uncertainty 
on the Court is really interesting. It captures in one number a lot 
of the different ideas of covariance among the Justices. Most 
other measures of variance consider correlation only between 
pairs of Justices.20 I want to raise two questions about this analy-
sis, however. The first is methodological and the second is more 
philosophical. 
If one is truly interested in entropy on the Court, then it is 
hard to justify ignoring cases in which some Justice voted differ-
ently in different parts of the case. Entropy is a measure of vari-
ance in the output of the Court, and surely fractured opinions 
should count as contributing both to output and to variance. One 
might argue that such cases are not very common and can be ig-
nored, but that is not obvious at all from the mathematics. If it 
were really true, then it would become evident in the entropy 
calculation. It makes sense to include fractured opinions and see 
what happens. 
The other difficulty with the way Sirovich calculates entropy 
is that he works with the set of Justices who concur in the judg-
ment of the Court and not with the set of Justices who join a 
specific opinion. As noted earlier, Sirovich codes Lawrence v. 
Texas as having been decided 6-3 with O'Connor in the majority, 
even though she did not join the majority opinion and concurred 
in the judgment on other grounds. The five in the majority struck 
down all sodomy laws on due process grounds; O'Connor would 
have struck down, on equal protection grounds, only those laws 
that applied solely to homosexual conduct. If one is concerned 
with variance in output, it is hard to justify lumping O'Connor 
with the rest of the majority since she disagreed both on the 
19. Sirovich, supra note 18. 
20. See Keith Poole, The Unidimensional Supreme Court, at http://voteview.uh.edu/ 
the_unidimensional_supreme_court.html; Harvard Table, supra note 13. 
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s?urce of the constitutional violation and the scope of the deci-
Sion. 
How then should one compute entropy? It would be better 
to examine all of the coalitions of Justices that formed. By coali-
tions I mean those collections of Justices who signed on to a 
common opinion. This is the method of analysis I have used ear-
lier in analyzing voting power1 and I think it makes sense in this 
context as well. Based on data from the October Term 1994 to 
October Term 2000,22 I compute entropy as 5.87, which is 
equivalent to 6.87 "platonic" Justices. This way of computing 
might tend to overstate variance, since different coalitions do not 
always significantly differ on the law. If I were forced to choose a 
specific number, I would probably average this value with that 
derived by Sirovich. 
Suppose, though, that we all agree on the appropriate way 
to measure entropy. This still leaves the most interesting ques-
tion unresolved: What level of entropy is appropriate for the 
Court? Does the level of entropy make any difference to the 
Court? 
In thinking about this question one must be careful to re-
member that entropy is dependent on the likelihood of distinct 
coalitions and not on the alignments of those coalitions as such. 
A court that was unanimous in every case would have the same 
entropy as a court that decided every case 5-4 with the same five 
Justices always in the majority. One would suspect that the latter 
arrangement would undermine political support for the Court 
while the former would be much better in that regard. Entropy, 
therefore, says little about the political stability of the Court. 
Moreover, having a lot of variability implies nothing about 
the quality of the judgments. As Sirovich notes, nine monkeys 
trained to flip coins and register votes accordingly would pro-
duce decisions with maximum entropy. And it is not clear that 
one should really expect a court to have that much variability. 
Some of the Justices will almost necessarily share some legal 
views. Their votes will inevitably be correlated, leading to a low-
ering of entropy. Docket selection would also likely reduce the 
variability from that of completely "platonic" court. 
Perhaps the most useful thing to do would be to see whether 
this measure of entropy correlates in some way with what is 
21. Edelman & Chen, supra note 12. 
22. Data available from me, but reported in Edelman & Chen, supra note 12 
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known historically about the Court. Is the entropy on Courts in 
which the Justices were thought to be on good personal terms? 
Is it really just a measure of unanimity? If the unanimous deci-
sions are factored out, do all the Courts have the same entropy? 
Do Courts with stable membership have more or less entropy 
than Courts that have had a more rapid turnover?23 I think these 
questions are potentially interesting ones, and ones that would 
be difficult to investigate empirically without thinking about 
them in the context of entropy. 
GEOMETRY AND THE COURT 
In the second part of his paper, Sirovich uses an entirely dif-
ferent technique to assess the variability of the decisions of the 
Court. In this section he takes a geometric point of view in an at-
tempt to measure how many degrees of freedom there are in the 
observed decisions. Before commenting on Sirovich's results, I 
want to give some elementary geometric background to make 
the following discussion more accessible. 
Imagine that we have a court with five judges, creatively 
named A, B, C, D, and E. In principle, the number of different 
vote patterns that we might observe (using Sirovich's convention 
that 1 indicates the judge is in the majority and a -1 indicates a 
vote in the minority) is 16=2n-I where n is 5, the number of judges 
on the court.24 Suppose, though, that on this court we know that 
A and B always vote the same way and that C, D, and E always 
vote the same way. The only vote patterns we observe are 
(1,1,1,1,1) and (-1,-1,1,1,1). In this situation, all of the vote pat-
terns lie on the straight line that goes between the two points 
(1,1,1,1,1) and (-1,-1,1,1,1). Even though in principle we need all 
five coordinates to describe the vote patterns, in practice we 
23. Thomas Merrill has hypothesized that Courts with stable membership are more 
likely to be innovative than one with more rapid turnover. See Thomas Merrill, The Mak-
ing of the Second Rehquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 653 
(2003) ("Given the closely divided nature of the Rehnquist Court and the divided gov-
ernment and society in which it operates, I think it is very unlikely that the Court would 
have generated the important changes in the law of constitutional federalism we have 
seen in the last eight years without the added boost from subnormal turnover."). But cf 
Jim Chen, Judicial Epochs in Supreme Court History: Sifting through the Record for 
Stitches in Time and Switches in Nine, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 677, 734 (2003) ("(W]e cannot 
discern a clear causal connection, if any, between the stability of the Supreme Court's 
membership and the Justices' propensity to craft aggressive new doctrines."). 
24. They are: (1,1,1,1,1), (1,1,1,1,-1), (1,1,1,-1,1), (1,1,-1,1,1), (1,-1,1,1,1), (-1,1,1,1,1), 
(1,1,1,-1,-1), (1,1,-1,1,-1), (1,1,-1,-1,1), (1,-1,1,1,-1), (1,-1,1,-1,1), (1,-1,-1,1,1), (-1,1,1,1,-1), 
(-1,1,1-1,1), (-1,1,-1,1,1), (-1,-1,1,1,1) where the first coordinate corresponds to A's vote 
and the last to E's. 
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really only need to know whether the judges A and B are in the 
minority or not to decide what the vote pattern was. Every vote 
pattern observed can be described algebraically by the equation 
(0,0,1,1,1) + t (1,1,0,0,0). If tis 1 then we have (1,1,1,1,1), and if t 
is -1 we get (-1,-1,1,1,1). In this sense the vector (1,1,0,0,0) is a 
coordinate vector that allows us to describe the decisions, and 
the value of tis the distance along that coordinate. 
Suppose that in 100 observations of our small court the pat-
tern of A and B voting together and C, D, and E voting together 
holds, except that in one case A joins with B and C to form a ma-
jority, and in a complete surprise, in one other case B, C, and D 
form a majority. The first of these cases is encoded as (1,1,1,-1,-1); 
the second as (-1,1,1,1,-1). 
Now there are vote patterns that do not fall on the line we 
described before. However, it should be intuitively clear that the 
line that we found is the best line that could be found-that is, 
among all lines it best "fits" the observed vote patterns. The 
measure for how well the line "fits" the vote patterns is calcu-
lated by computing for each vote pattern the square of its dis-
tance from the line, taking the average of all of these square dis-
tances, and then taking the square root.25 Moreover, there would 
seem to be little reason to give up on our assumption that the 
line is still the best description of the vote patterns of the Court 
just because we have two outliers. 
This second assertion is subject to a number of caveats. The 
two outliers might have been cases of particular salience, in 
which case we might not want to ignore them. In addition these 
cases might represent a new trend that foreshadows a break-
down in our observed pattern. These are important concerns. I 
will address the former in this section. The latter I leave for an-
other time, except to say that assessing changes in patterns of 
voting is an interesting and difficult empirical issue. 26 
Consider a somewhat different hypothetical five-judge 
court. Suppose that there are only three observed decisions: 
(1,1,1,1,1), (-1,-1,1,1,1) and (1,1,1, -1,-1). These three decisions 
do not lie on any line, but they do line on a plane. By a plane I 
mean a set of points that can be described using two coordinate 
25. This is usually referred to as the root mean square and is the standard measure 
of deviation in statistics. See DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, 
STATISTICS 66 (3d ed. 1998). 
26. For one sophisticated approach see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The 
Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making: Again Revisiting The Judicial Mind 
(2001). 
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vectors, which in this case would be (1,1,1,1,1) + t (0,0,0,1,1) + s 
(1,1,0,0,0) where if t = s = 0 we get the unanimity vector, if t=-2 
and s = 0 we get (1,1,1,-1,-1), and so forth.27 As before, if a few 
decisions deviate from that form, this plane may still be the best 
approximation for the data even if it is not a perfect fit. We refer 
to (0,0,0,1,1) and (1,1,0,0,0) as coordinate vectors as before. 
Let us now return to the data that Sirovich collected from 
voting patterns of the Supreme Court. As we just saw, it is possi-
ble that the data, although nominally requiring nine coordinates 
to describe, really only require a smaller number of coordinates 
to get a good "fit." There a number of different methods one 
might use to fit the data. Sirovich employs the technique of sin-
gular value decomposition. Singular value decomposition simul-
taneously approximates a set of data by the best line, plane, 
three-dimensional space, etc. It will also provide the best set of 
coordinates for describing the data. It is closely related to factor 
analysis in statistics and is now in common use in many fields in-
cluding computer recognition and mathematical biology.28 
Sirovich's principal conclusion is that the vote patterns of 
the Court can be best approximated by a certain plane whose 
coordinate vectors are called vt>29 which is close to the unanimity 
vector (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1), and a vector v2•30 which is close to the 
conservative-liberal (c-1) 5-4 vector (-1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1).31 The 
unanimity and c-1 vectors play a key role because they are the 
two most common voting patterns on the Court, accounting for 
almost 57% of all decisions; as a result they are weighted quite 
heavily in any approximation scheme. 
As Keith Poole has noted,32 Sirovich's result is consistent 
with current work on the Court by many political scientists. This 
27. What I've really described here is an affine plane since it does not go through 
the origin (0,0,0,0,0). In Sirovich's case the approximating plane does go through the ori-
gin. 
28. GILBERT STRANG, LINEAR ALGEBRA AND ITS APPLICATIONS 137 (3d ed. 
1988). 
29. The coordinates of v1 are (.341, .333, 353, .363, .347, .313, .238 ,.264, .316) (to 
three significant digits). 
30. The coordinates of v2 are (-.327, -.368, .174, .104, .304, .403, .-.313, -.446, .406) 
(to three significant digits). 
31. The axis that is close to the unanimity vector gives a smaller value to the Ste-
vens coordinate than to the others, presumably because Stevens is the most likely Justice 
to be a lone dissenter. The axis near the conservative-liberal 5-4 vector is noticeably 
smaller in the Kennedy and O'Connor coordinates, presumably because they are the 
conservatives most likely to abandon this coalition. Keith Poole has noted that the coor-
dinates in v2 mirror a plot of the Justices on a liberal-conservative axis. See Poole, supra 
note 20. 
32. !d. 
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work employs spatial voting models, which attempt to identify 
each Justice with an ideal point in a policy space and then model 
issues as cutting planes in such a way that the set of Justices on 
one side of the plane vote one way and those on the other vote 
the opposite. The techniques used to approximate these ideal 
points are closely related to those employed by Sirovich. They 
lead to the same conclusion, that the decisions of the Court are 
best approximated by two dimensions. Poole avers that the bet-
ter way to analyze the data is to ignore the unanimous decisions. 
He concludes that the Court is in fact one-dimensional.33 
What is novel about Sirovich's analysis is that he is inter-
ested in approximating the decisions rather than using the deci-
sions to approximate the ideal points of the Justices.34 The more 
common way to deal with spatial voting analysis is to simultane-
ously approximate preference points for the voters and equa-
tions for the cutting planes that define a vote. Sirovich takes the 
outcome of the vote as fixed and tries to approximate that data. 
As we will see, this particular choice of coordinates for the vote 
is problematic. It is surprising, actually, that his results are so 
close to those obtained by other methods. 
Before examining his results more closely, we should recall 
what the criterion is for the measure of "best" approximation. 
The measure used to define the "best" approximation is the sum 
of the squares of the distances from the vote patterns to the ap-
proximating object. The best line is the line that minimizes the 
sum of the squares of the distances from each data point to the 
line. This distance is computed for each outcome of the Court so 
that, for example, the distance from the unanimous vote pattern 
to the line is added each time the Court rendered a unanimous 
decision. As a consequence it is not surprising the two coordi-
nate vectors of the approximating plane are close to the two 
most common vote patterns. 
Sirovich shov.s that the plane spanned by v1 and v2 accounts, 
on average, for roughly 80 percent of the data.35 While this is a 
substantial amount, I am not sure that it can support the claim 
that "[ t]he implication is that the decision space of the Rehnquist 
Court requires only two dimensions for its description."36 I say 
33. !d. Poole gives a sketch of the details of this argument on his web site. 
34. For a sophisticated algorithm see KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING, 233-51 App. A 
(1997). 
35. Sirovich, supra note 5, at 7434 tbl.3. 
36. !d. at 7434. 
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this for two reasons. The first is that vote patterns of some of the 
most salient decisions are not well-approximated by this plane. 
Second, the geometry that Sirovich uses is not consistent with 
any legal analysis. 
First, let us consider how well this plane really approximates 
the data. Take, for example, the decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
in which Justice Kennedy joined the liberals to form a 5-4 major-
ity opinion of the Court. Sirovich would code this as a 6-3 since 
O'Connor joined the other five as to the outcome, even though 
she did not join the majority opinion. This 5-4 opinion I would 
encode as (1,1,1,-1,-1,-1,1,1,-1). Because this vote pattern is not 
on the plane of approximation, we might want to ask which point 
on the approximating plane is closest to it, that is, how well this 
plane approximates this vote pattern. A short calculation37 shows 
that the point on the approximating plane closest to 
(1,1,1,-1,-1,-1,1,1,-1) is (to three decimal places) 
(0.924, 1.022, -0.322, -0.147, -0.652, -0.909, 0.890, 1.196, -0.915). 
One curious thing about this vector, which is supposed to be a 
good approximation to (1,1,1,-1,-1,-1,1,1,-1), is that in Kennedy's 
coordinate (the third one) the approximating point is negative. 
Because Kennedy was in the majority the value should be 1 in 
that coordinate. In fact, Kennedy's coordinate is closer to being -1 
than is O'Connor's (the fourth coordinate), even though she was in 
the minority and should therefore display a value of -1. 
Indeed, the distance from the Lawrence v. Texas vote pat-
tern to the approximating plane is 1.6, over half the length of the 
original vote pattern.38 A similar calculation shows that the ap-
proximation of the vote pattern encoding a 5-4 decision consist-
ing of O'Connor and the liberals in the majority (say, as in Grut-
te~9) is similarly inaccurate. Sirovich's approximation assigns the 
wrong sign to O'Connor. 
On what, then, does Sirovich base his claim that his plane is 
a good approximation of the data? The criterion he uses is the 
ability of the approximation to estimate the margin by which the 
majority is carried. In a 5-4 decision the majority is carried by a 
margin of one; in a unanimous decision the margin is nine. It is 
37. It is a standard problem in elementary linear algebra to find the point on a 
plane closest to some point that is not on the plane. See Strang, supra note 28, at 103. 
. .38. The length of the encoding vector is 3 (as are all coding vectors since each entry 
1s either a 1 or -1). Recall that the length of a vector is the square root of the sum of the 
squares of its entries. Since all the entries are either 1 or -1, and there are nine entries in 
total, the sum of the squares is 9 and hence the length is 3. 
39. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
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easy to see that the margin of a decision is just the sum of the 
coordinates of the vote pattern. For example, the c-1 vote pat-
tern, with coordinates ( -1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1 ), has five 1 's and four 
-1's, and therefore the sum of the entries is 1, the margin of vic-
tory. Sirovich tests his approximation by how the sum of the co-
ordinates of the approximating point approximates the sum of 
the coordinates of the vote pattern. 
As an example, consider the vote pattern for Lawrence. The 
margin of the decision is 1. The sum of the coordinates of the 
approximating vector is 1.087. If this is rounded to the nearest 
integer we get 1, the same number as the actual margin. This, for 
Sirovich, shows that the approximation is a good one. If one 
were only interested in the margin by which the majority pre-
vails, this is a reasonable measure. But if one is interested in a 
more detailed assessment, in particular how an individual Justice 
might vote, this measure is much less informative. 
Moreover, a peculiar mathematical feature of this criterion 
affects the accuracy of the approximation. For some vote pat-
terns the approximating plane that Sirovich uses gives a worse 
approximation for the voting margin than the best approximat-
ing line! That is, this measure of fit does not improve with more 
dimensions in which to work. An example of this is Lawrence. 
As noted above, the sum of the coordinates of the point on the 
approximating plane closest to this vote pattern is 1.087. The 
sum of the coordinates of the approximating vector on the line 
of best fit is .933, which is closer to the actual margin.40 In spite 
of Sirovich's comments to the contrary,41 it is difficult to see how 
his two-dimensional approximation optimizes the distance from 
the true margin of the decision. 
Sirovich has quite an intriguing figure in his paper that 
graphically depicts how well each vote pattern of the Court is 
approximated by his plane.42 Not surprisingly the twelve most 
common vote patterns are well approximated (and these account 
for roughly 80% of all outcomes) but many vote patterns do not 
seem very close to their approximation at all. As noted by Si-
rovich in his final comments,43 this geometric model is not very 
good at distinguishing those vote patterns that do occur from 
those that don't. That is, there are a number of vote patterns that 
40. The line of best fit is the one obtained by taking multiples of the vector v1. This 
follows from the nature of the singular value decomposition. 
41. See, e.g., Sirovich, supra note 5, at 7436. 
42. !d. (fig. 1). 
43. /d. at 7437. 
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are well approximated by the plane but which for some reason 
have never been realized, as well many vote patterns that have 
appeared but are poorly approximated by the plane. 
Even if Sirovich's planar approximation should be consid-
ered a good fit, it is far from clear that it is an appropriate way to 
think about the decisions of the Court. To see this, consider the 
following question: Which decision is closer to the c-1 split, a 
unanimous decision or a 5-4 decision with O'Connor and the 
four liberals in the majority? I think that most people concerned 
with the behavior of the Court would say the latter, since the 
only difference in the alignment is the movement of O'Connor 
from one side to the other, whereas a unanimous decision would 
require four Justices to alter their votes. But that is not the right 
answer according to Sirovich. 
For Sirovich, the c-1 split is coded (-1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1) and 
so the distance between it and the unanimous decision (which is 
coded as (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)) is 4.44 The distance between the c-1 
split and the other 5-4 split (coded as (1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,1,-1)) is ap-
proximately 5.657.45 What happens in this encoding is that the c-1 
split differs from the unanimous decision in only 4 coordinates 
but it differs from the other 5-4 split in eight coordinates (every-
one other than O'Connor). 
When Sirovich produces a plane that provides a "good" ap-
proximation for the vote patterns of the Court, this approxima-
tion is with respect to the geometry of his coordinatization, and 
not necessarily with respect to any legal intuition as to what is 
close. And in fact it is on the 5-4 decisions other than the c-1 split 
that this approximation performs at its worst, which is not that 
surprising given that these are the decisions for which no one has 
a good theoretical explanation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Sirovich's paper should not be dismissed lightly as using "a 
more complicated method to belabor the obvious."46 The idea of 
using entropy as a way of quantifying variance in the decisions of 
the Court is novel and interesting, although I suggest an alterna-
44. The difference of the two vectors is (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)-(-1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1)=(2,2,0,0,0,0,2,2,0) 
whose length is the square root of the sum of the square of the entries-that is, the 
square root of 22+22+22+22=16 which is 4. 
45. (1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,1,-1)-(-1,-1,1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1)=(2,2,-2,0,-2,-2,2,2,2) whose length is the 
square root of 32 which is approximately 5.657. 
46. Gugliotta, supra note 2. 
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tive method to doing this calculation. His use of singular value 
decomposition amounts to a variation on standard spatial voting 
models and as such is less novel.47 It does highlight the incom-
mensurability between certain geometric methods of analysis 
and legal methods of analysis in a way that might be helpful in 
the future. 
47. The fact that his results are so close to more sophisticated models actually raises 
interesting mathematical issues, but those are not likely to be interesting to the readers of 
this journal. 
